GOOD PASSWORD HYGIENE

From Ars Technica:

GOOD PASSWORD HYGIENE:

Use a program such as Password Safe orLastPass to generate and store all your passwords, and make sure they are protected by a master password that's truly strong, unique, and memorable.

Use this password management app to randomly generate passcodes that are a minimum of 13 characters. If you won't be typing the password into a smartphone or other device with a limited keyboard, make sure each password has symbols. Otherwise, a mix of lower-case letters, capital letters, and numbers will suffice.

Generate a unique password for every account that contains any personally identifying information about you.

Change your password at least once every six months, and more often for your most sensitive accounts or after you've used a network you don't trust. Change your password immediately if you learn the site it's used to access has been breached.

When signing in to websites, try to use a login URL that begins with "https."

Dealing with Toxic Employees, Notes

Two forces drive the workplace: fear and desire.

Fear is loss-averse, desire is risk-seeking.

When you face a problem (specifically people problem) follow the fear. How is it working on you, the others you interact with? ...what is it costing the organization?

Fight or flight---fear has pretty much disconnected the executive functions in the prefrontal cortex. The limbic system has taken over. You can run like hell, but you can't do much else until the fears subside.

Relax.

Observe.

Face the fear.

Access your observational and planning functions.

Isolate, depersonalize and distance yourself from the fear.

How does desire play? Who has it, what is it they seek?

Now access your subcortical regions (play).

Acknowledge loss aversion.

Calculate the risk.

Speak to desire.

My Standing Desk is Now My Station

Taking a seat at a my desk is a commitment to a stay for a while. I am disposed to relaxation. I am vulnerable. Once here, my body will be constrained, my reach, limited, and departure will involve some effort. 

Approaching my station leaves me freer to move about, and invites me to stay only as long as the immediate task is at hand. My posture is erect, alert, and commanding. Like the pilot at the wheel of his ship, or the hunter surveying the valley below, I am disposed to action.

Station is an old word--at least 600 years old in English and French. It derives from the latin verb status, to stand, which is in turn, the root of "state". It has grown metaphorically to embrace notions of social position (my station in life) , workplace (workstation) , military (position guarded by armed men), communications (radio and television stations)  and scientific spaces, to name a few.

A station is where I re-fuel, pick up my mail, and get my news. I like the fact that it encompasses more than a piece for furniture; it is the action I perform here, as well as a deliberate fixing of the space around the floor, desk and shelves that make it up.

Definition of STATION

1

a : the place or position in which something or someone stands or is assigned to stand or remainb : any of the places in a manufacturing operation at which one part of the work is donec : equipment used usually by one person for performing a particular job

2

: the act or manner of standing : posture

3

: a stopping place: asa (1) : a regular stopping place in a transportation route station

> (2) : the building connected with such a stopping place : depot 3b : one of the stations of the cross

4

a : a post or sphere of duty or occupationb : a stock farm or ranch especially of Australia or New Zealand

5

: standing, rank station

>

6

: a place for specialized observation and study of scientific phenomena station

> station>

7

: a place established to provide a public service: asa (1) : fire station (2) : police stationb : a branch post office

8

: gas station

9

a : a complete assemblage of radio or television equipment for transmitting or receivingb : the place in which such a station is located

 See station defined for English-language learners »

See station defined for kids »

Examples of STATION

1. They drove him to the bus station.
2. The waiters were at their stations in the dining room.
3. The sailors were ordered to man their battle stations.
4. He had married above his station.
5. They were aware of her station in life.

Origin of STATION

Middle English stacioun, from Anglo-French estation, statiun, from Latin station-, statio, from stare to stand — more at stand

First Known Use: 14th century

More on classic expository writing(and oral presentation)

"In the scene of classic joint attention, there is something directly perceptible.  In contrast, the network of ideas we want to present may not be directly perceptible.  The human mind—uniquely among species—is routinely skillful at blending things that don’t naturally go together.  In the complex network, the subject may be completely imperceptible. But in the blend, we treat the subject as if it is something directly perceptible. The result is that we can talk about anything at all as if it is directly perceptible: someone’s disappointment or sense of the absurd, a city’s magnificence or a country’s intransigence, a neighborhood’s poverty or a wine’s elegance—all these invisible things and an endless list of others are treated as if they were directly perceptible.

Nowhere in this quote is the word metaphor, but this is what's at play.

The "network of ideas" is what Shimon Edelman would call a "cloud" of thoughts, perceived not as distinct, but present in potential, waiting to be drawn out into actual utterance. 

The "Secret" of Good Exposition?

Steven Pinker puts us on to a new book that sounds maybe even more interesting than Strunk and White, and perhaps even science-based. It is described here (link)

Francis-Noël Thomas & Mark Turner, authors of Clear and Simple as the Truth: Writing Classic Prose (Second Edition) have written A Natural Way To Write, an op-ed which explores the concept of “teaching writing” and examines the process of writing itself.

"There is, however, a species-wide, ancient behavior underlying writing.  Cognitive scientists call it joint attention, and we think it is the most sensible and practical place to begin learning to write.  In joint attention, two or more people are attending to something, they know they are all attending to it, they know that they are all engaging with each other by attending to it, and they know that they all know all of that.  This is home turf for the cognitively modern human mind, which all human beings have had for approximately the past fifty thousand years.  More specifically, the cognitive core of writing is “classic joint attention,” in which there are just two people, paying attention to something that is directly perceptible. We never feel any difficulty when we are pointing out something directly perceptible to somebody next to us.  We are built for this.  We feel at home doing it because the scene of classic joint attention is intelligible by itself.  We expect our companion to be able to perceive what we are presenting once it is pointed out.

In order to talk, we blend a complicated mental network, one that often ranges far from home, with a familiar scene—like classic joint attention—so that the foreign network has a domestic anchor.  If we make such a blend, and speak from it, our speech becomes intelligible, consistent, coherent, and familiar, even though the speaker is dealing with a diffuse, complex, foreign network of ideas and relationships.  The complex network is assimilated to a simple scene through blending.

Consider, as an example of classic style, the following passage from La Rochefoucauld:

Madame de Chevreuse had sparkling intelligence, ambition, and beauty in plenty; she was flirtatious, lively, bold, enterprising; she used all her charms to push her projects to success, and she almost always brought disaster to those she encountered on her way...

"In the scene of classic joint attention, there is something directly perceptible.  In contrast, the network of ideas we want to present may not be directly perceptible.  The human mind—uniquely among species—is routinely skillful at blending things that don’t naturally go together.  In the complex network, the subject may be completely imperceptible. But in the blend, we treat the subject as if it is something directly perceptible. The result is that we can talk about anything at all as if it is directly perceptible: someone’s disappointment or sense of the absurd, a city’s magnificence or a country’s intransigence, a neighborhood’s poverty or a wine’s elegance—all these invisible things and an endless list of others are treated as if they were directly perceptible.

In the mental network of ideas and thought supporting your presentation, the audience may be large and psychologically disposed in a variety of ways. But in classic joint attention, we are speaking to just one other person collusively. So in the blend, we treat the audience like a competent individual who colludes with us to recognize what we are pointing out. In the actual network, the purpose can be anything, or multiple, and conflicting. But in classic joint attention, the purpose is always simply disinterested presentation. So, in the blend, purposes in the network are compressed to presentation....

"There are only two steps to learning to talk this way: (1) think of a scene of classic joint attention; (2) blend it with whatever mental network of thoughts and relationships you confront, and speak from the blend."

So, to write good exposition, one must repair to the classic human experience that pre-exists literacy (a mere 2 or 3 thousand years, and perhaps even orality (50 thousand years), where I point to something and I know you see it too. One must stand in relation to the matter as one would if it were out there in front of us both, like a fish on the beach, or a skewered piece of meat on a stick, something self-evident, real and mutually tangible to two or more people. How do you do this when the "matter" is only in your mind?


One practical thought is that to me, the clearest exposition occurs when the speaker is attending to an object you can see as well (a whiteboard/chalk talk, or a cooking show). When you only have text, or an audio presentation, the ability of the presenter to summon up the referred object--be it  a mental model, or a vivid description is the operative factor.


Lately, I've been studying metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, then Sullivan and Rees) and will soon reinvestigate "story", both by re-reading some of the analytic work and a new book The Story-telling Animal by Gottschall. I'm going to pursue the connections among these three elements (metaphor, shared attention and story) and see what light it can shed on presentations and learning.

Perhaps a book worth reading.

Reading Lakoff and Johnson, "Metaphors we Live By"

This book (originally published in 1980) has re-ignited my interest in philosophy, and given me hope that there are useful answers to be found to some of the things in life that most confound us--namely our habitual and unreflected habits of thought.

They have turned me around on something I've said for years; that metaphor is the loom of language.

It may well be, but Lakoff and Johnson and the Neural Theory of Language (NTL)are saying that metaphor precedes language, and that cognition itself is inherently metaphorical. Metaphors may turn up in literary language as consciously elaborated figures ( all of Shakespeare for instance) but these guys show us that metaphors (ontological and orientational) lie immediately below the surface of our plainest language. Metaphor is not just a game of words--it is what the brain does, arching relentlessly from the more concrete experiences to the less concrete. Perhaps, from this perspective, metaphor appears as an artifact of language only because it has been wired in to the human brain from the beginning.

They show that a metaphor can be more than apt, it can be generative. As evidence, they offer a novel structural metaphor, LOVE IS A COLLABORATIVE WORK OF ART, then systematically mine it for the new insights and meanings the wrought metaphor can deliver. I really appreciate their making an effort to roll out the theory for a non-technical reader.


It strikes me, as a practical matter, that an effort to de-construct our everyday thinking about such matters as WORK, LOVE, and LIFE could reveal the inherent masking and revealing such implicit metaphorical concepts accomplish. On a very mundane level, say we dredge up with something like,  SALES IS WAR. A lot of what people commonly think and feel about "sales" could be explained by bringing this particular figure to the surface. We will find apt-ness to be sure. A lot of sales feels like combat, a zero-sum game where I win and you lose. We might also see what the metaphor masks, that sales is in many ways a collaborative and complimentary experience, one that can be creative and mutually beneficial transaction in a way that war could never be. 


Going a bit further, perhaps a disciplined exegesis of the text of our lives could reveal the traps and opportunities to be realized by swapping old, unstudied metaphors for new ones that make us happer and more successful. We'd start with the casual language we use, then drill down to the conceptual strata below.


Not a new idea, I'm sure. Perhaps this is what cognitive therapies (the insane sentence, etc.) do. What's new here, and potentially useful to the practioner is the deeply analytical approach and the tie to insights from classic philosophy and contemporary linguistics.  



Here, I'll quote extensively from Peter Norvig, I belive a colleague at UC Berkeley:



"Lakoff and Johnson's ``Metaphors We Live By'' (henceforth ``MWLB'') is an important contribution to the study of metaphor that presents a number of controversial points. Investigating these points provides a good backdrop for presenting the state-of-the-art of metaphor in AI work.
First of all, ``Metaphors We Live By'' is an accessible and thought-provoking source of examples demonstrating the range of metaphor in everyday language and thought. This is not a technical book; it is aimed at a general audience. There is very little terminology, nary a greek letter, and no lists of `starred' ungrammatical sentences. Instead, the arguments are stated simply, and are illustrated by examples which are usually phrases one has heard, or at least could imagine someone actually saying.
The examples show that metaphor is not just a rhetorical device of poets. It is metaphor to speak of arguments in terms of battles, as in ``I demolished his argument'' or ``his claims are indefensible.'' It is metaphor to use spatial prepositions to describe non-spatial relationships, as with ``Harry is in love'' or ``Harry is in the Elks'' or ``Harry is in trouble.'' It is metaphor to personify, as when we say ``Cancer finally caught up with him.''


After demonstrating the pervasiveness of metaphor, the second contribution of Lakoff and Johnson is in showing a small number of highly productive metaphor schemata that underly much of language understanding. As an example, one particularly pervasive and productive metaphor is Michael Reddy's conduit metaphor, which underlies the understanding of communication. The conduit metaphor has three constituent metaphors: IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS, and COMMUNICATING IS SENDING. The metaphor is expressed in phrases like ``it's hard to get that idea across,'' ``it's difficult to put my ideas into words,'' or ``his words carry little meaning.'' Another example of a systematic metaphor schema is MORE IS UP, which leads to expressions like ``the deficit is soaring'' or ``his income fell.'' Such schemata are motivated, but not predicted. It is easy to see why MORE IS UP is a better metaphor than MORE IS DOWN, but one still has to learn which of the many reasonable metaphors are actually used within a culture. Once the metaphor schema is learned, it is easy to generate new instances of it. Lakoff and Johnson present about fifty basic metaphor schemata, with many examples of each.
To Lakoff and Johnson, metaphors are not just matters of language, but are used extensively in reasoning and understanding. Typically, an abstract domain is understood metaphorically in terms of a more concrete domain. To a large degree, they argue, the human conceptual system is metaphorical. This is very different from the classical model of metaphor, which claims that metaphors are artifacts of language use, and have nothing to do with meaning or understanding. It is also very different from most AI models of knowledge representation and language understanding.
The classical theory of metaphor also says that metaphors arise from objective similarity. Thus, we can speak of `digesting an idea' because the mental action of attending to the expression of an idea, reasoning about it, and coming to understand it is objectively similar to the physical action of ingesting food, breaking it into nutrients, and absorbing them into the system. Lakoff and Johnson argue against the idea of a priori objective similarity. They claim metaphors do not just point out similarities that are objectively true; they create the similarities. 


The notion of digesting an idea is coherent only within the context of other metaphors, such as IDEAS ARE OBJECTS and THE MIND IS A CONTAINER. These basic metaphors both create similarities of their own and allow for the creation of further similarities in the IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor. The second half of MWLB is not really about metaphors at all; it is a comparison of the traditional objectivist theory of semantics with a new view they call the experientialist theory of meaning."



The work leads to a deeper study of the embodiment of the mind, and another book by the same authors. I'm lifting the following (technical) pasages from John F. Sowa's review in Computational Linguistics, vol. 25, no. 4, December 1999.

"George Lakoff and Mark Johnson begin with three sentences that summarize and characterize their book:

The mind is inherently embodied.
Thought is mostly unconscious.
Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical.

Part I supports these sentences with findings from cognitive science "that human reason is a form of animal reason, a reason inextricably tied to our bodies and the peculiarities of our brains" and "that our bodies, brains, and interactions with our environment provide the mostly unconscious basis for our everyday metaphysics, that is, our sense of what is real." The third sentence is a summary of their earlier work on metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), which in Part II of this book they extend to a more detailed analysis of the metaphors underlying basic philosophical issues, such as time, events and causes, mind, self, and morality. Part III applies that analysis to the metaphors tacitly assumed by philosophers ranging from the Presocratics to Noam Chomsky. Part IV presents arguments for "empirically responsible philosophy" and its potential for understanding "who we are, how we experience our world, and how we ought to live." Finally, the appendix summarizes research inspired by this philosophy that has produced computational simulations of certain aspects of embodied minds.
Given such a broad scope, the authors have not been able to cover all the topics with equal success. Instead of challenging all of western philosophy, they should have concentrated on their major opponent, Noam Chomsky and his philosophy of language. Lakoff began his career in linguistics as a student and later a teacher of Chomsky's version of transformational grammar. But in the late 1960s, he joined with other former students to promote generative semantics as an alternative to Chomsky's generative syntax. The result was a series of "linguistic wars," whose history has been retold by various participants over the past twenty years.




...


By showing the importance of the human motor and perceptual mechanisms for language understanding, these studies give concrete meaning to the catchphrase embodied mind. The "neural" metaphor, however, is not entirely justified, since the computational mechanisms that support these systems are mostly classical. 


Whereas the authors devote 44 pages to Chomsky, they cover all of "Anglo-American analytic philosophy" in 29 pages, while lumping together Frege, Russell, Carnap and the Vienna Circle, Quine, Goodman, Davidson, Putnam, Kripke, Montague, and Lewis. In the same chapter, they continue with ordinary language philosophy (Strawson, Austin, and the later Wittgenstein), which they consider to be based on the same metaphors. Yet these philosophers have expressed widely divergent views on the embodiment of mind, the nature of language, and Chomsky's theory of autonomous syntax. By drawing finer distinctions, the authors might have claimed some of them as potential allies against Chomsky's position.
For the classical philosophers, the authors use their terminology of metaphors and folk theories to make a rather conventional commentary seem novel. Plato, they claim, "had the metaphor Essences As Ideas, Aristotle has the converse metaphor, Ideas Are Essences." No philosopher who hopes to be "empirically responsible" should make such statements without much deeper analysis of how those metaphors relate to the words that Plato and Aristotle actually used.


...


In summary, this book makes an important contribution to the ongoing debates about the roles of syntax, semantics, and world knowledge in language understanding and their dependency on the physical world and the human mechanisms for perceiving, interpreting, and interacting with the world. Its major weakness is its tendency to exclude other perspectives, such as Aristotle's, which can accommodate both formal logic and a theory of embodied mind. Although the authors frequently use the word neural, none of their discussion depends on the actual structure or method of operation of a neuron. NTL could with equal justification be considered an acronym for a Neoaristotelian Theory of Language.

Words and Experiences

Our first way of knowing is through our senses. Language is the second.
The sense-become-word is a point of departure, allowing us to transfer that sense from one context to another.

We are playing at the pool, my 4 year old grandson and me, with a 2 foot long piece of PVC. First, we are blowing air into the submerged end, making huge bubbles erupt on the surface. Then the pipe becomes a water gun, shooting a spray of water across the pool. Then we are taking turns pressing our lips together and blowing into the empty pipe to make new sounds. I do it first, then I hand him the pipe and say, "blow". And he does, and after a few tries, hits on a resonant note. The pipe produces a new kind of sound he can feel as well as hear. He laughs out loud.

Primary play, learning hydraulics and pneumatics by feel, sight and sound. Stumbling across the secret to making music.

In a few years, he will learn about electricity, and he will be able to tap into these experiences to grasp the unseen. He will be able to draw upon these moments of pool play, then imagine how a current of electrons might flow under pressure, from one place to the next, and how that can do work.

He will be in a music class, and will recall that experience of resonance, and apply it to string length, and to tone, and undertone, and so forth.

Language allows abstraction. We can teach children words, and they can be heard using them, but language must be charged with primary experience if it is to bear intellectual fruit.

JEC

Deliberate Practice (2)

It comes as little surprise that, the more time one spends noodling over something, the deeper the learning effect. Learning research shows that the quality of your practice is just as important as the quantity, and expert-level performance is primarily the result of expert-level practice , not innate talent.

K. Anders Ericsson, a psychologist and scientific researcher out of Florida State University in the paper titled The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance:


"People believe that because expert performance is qualitatively different from normal performance the expert performer must be endowed with characteristics qualitatively different from those of normal adults. This view has discouraged scientists from systematically examining expert performers and accounting for their performance in terms of the laws and principles of general psychology"

One of Ericsson's core findings is that how expert one becomes at a skill has more to do with how one practices than with merely performing a skill a large number of times. An expert breaks down the skills that are required to be expert and focuses on improving those skill chunks during practice or day-to-day activities, often paired with immediate coaching feedback. Another important feature of deliberate practice lies in continually practicing a skill at more challenging levels with the intention of mastering it.[4] Deliberate practice is also discussed in the books, "Talent is Overrated," by Geoff Colvin[5], and "The Talent Code," by Daniel Coyle,[6]among others.

What is the technique?

In music, it may be the "chunking" of performance. In other areas of learning, the intentionality of the focused attention is important. In one study, a researcher Wieman trained a postdoc, Louis Deslauriers, and a graduate student, Ellen Schelew, asked students to think like scientists and puzzle out problems during class. For 1 week, Deslauriers and Schelew took over one section of an introductory physics course for engineering majors, which met three times for 1 hour. A tenured physics professor continued to teach another large section using the standard lecture format.

The results were dramatic: After the intervention, the students in the deliberate practice section did more than twice as well on a 12-question multiple-choice test of the material as did those in the control section. They were also more engaged—attendance rose by 20% in the experimental section, according to one measure of interest—and a post-study survey found that nearly all said they would have liked the entire 15-week course to have been taught in the more interactive manner.

(I'd like to see more about the impact of assignment, task-framing or  purpose.)

Medical Education (Wikipedia article)

Duvivier et. al. reconstructed the concept of deliberate practice into practical principles to describe the process as it relates to clinical skill acquisition. They defined deliberate practice as:

1. repetitive performance of intended cognitive or psychomotor skills.
2. rigorous skills assessment
3. specific information feedback
4. better skills performance^[8]

They further described the personal skills learners need to exhibit at various stages of skill development in order to be successful in developing their clinical skills. This includes:

1. planning (organize work in a structured way).
2. concentration/dedication (higher attention span)
3. repetition/revision (strong tendency to practice)
4. study style/self reflection (tendance to self-regulate learning)^[9]

While the study only included medical students, the authors found that repetitious practice may only help the novice learner (year 1) because as expertise is developed, the learner must focus and plan their learning around specific deficiencies. Curriculum must be designed to develop students' ability to plan their learning as they progress in their careers.

Finally, the findings in the study also have implications for developing self-regulated behaviors in students. Initially, a medical student may need focused feedback from instructors, however as they progress they must develop the ability to self-assess.

Links:
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/05/a-better-way-to-teach.html
http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=1993-40718-001

A good post, citing examples from musical performance:

http://expertenough.com/1423/deliberate-practice

Pattern Language for the Standing Desk

Returning to  Pattern Language, my revered old bible of 1960's utopianism, I discover that there is no entry for "standing desk", "writing desk", or "workbench".  They missed it! Even though there is considerable anthropological evidence for the universality of standing work, Alexander and the others assumed that all sustained work is done whilst sitting on a floor or chair.

There ought to be a new pattern for what I'm about. It would go something like this:

Standing desk or workbench


In every workplace, there should be provision for close and precise work to be executed from a standing position. The resulting work surface would be from 40 to 50 inches from the floor. It would be deep and broad enough to accomodate one's papers, screens, keyboard, etc. There should be storage at hand (open shelves, 200) for papers, writing implements and hand tools, and a vertical display area for pictures, reference items and other objects comprising the personal shrine (two more missing patterns!). Secondary and rest seating should also be provided (stools, footrests or high-chairs) to allow for postural diversity during extended work sessions. 

• The optimal work height for an individual would be determined by where the hand rests when the elbow is bent, forearm level to the floor (see waist-high shelf, 201). 
• The optimal depth of the bench shall be the distance one can reach forward comfortably to retrieve a tool.

I'm copying out some of Jason Yip's post on stand-up meetings. He has figured out how to make this practice work, and in doing so has identified some of the relevant sociology and psychology of the standing desk as well:


It's Not Just Standing Up: Patterns for Daily Stand-up Meetings
Jason Yip, ThoughtWorks, Inc.
jcyip@thoughtworks.com
Introduction
The daily stand-up meeting is simple to describe: the whole team meets every day for a quick status update. This short definition does not, however, sufficiently communicate the subtle details that distinguish between an effective and sub-optimal implementation of the practice.

People who have experienced effective stand-ups will generally know what should be adjusted to improve a bad one. This is much more difficult for people with limited stand-up experience to reflect upon. This paper is an attempt to alleviate this difficulty by describing the benefits and consequences of common practices for daily stand-ups.  They are intended to help direct the experimentation and adjustment of new practitioners as well as provide points of reflection to experienced practitioners.

Goals of Daily Stand-up Meetings
Summarizing several papers and references ([Anderson, 2002], [Beedle et al., 2000], [OrgPatterns, 2003], [Rising, 2002], [Rising and Janoff, 2002], [Wells, 1999]) daily stand-ups should achieve the following goals:
· communicate daily status, progress, and plans to the team and any observers,
· identify obstacles more quickly so that the team can take steps to remove them,
· set focus for the rest of the day,
· increase team building and socialization.

Perhaps the key value of requiring daily status is what it requires of the participants: daily reflection.

The goal is to get everyone moving in the same direction.  The stand-up is used to continually remind the team what that direction is......However, there is a different “feel” to a well-run stand-up that distinguishes it from an empty ritual. The original description of daily stand-up meetings called them Daily Scrums [Beedle et al., 2000] with an intentional association to the rugby term. The energy level of a daily stand-up should perhaps not be quite as high as that of a rugby scrum but it should still feel energizing. Quickness and high energy support the goal of setting focus.  Long, low-energy meetings tend to distract and mute the day.

When things are going right, there isn't much direction or facilitation of the stand-up. It tends to be more self-organising.  This is really more a side-effect of an effective, motivated team.
Patterns

ALL HANDS
People  and representatives from various areas wish to know about and/or contribute to the status and
progress of the project.  Communicating status in multiple meetings and reports requires a lot of duplicate effort. Therefore
Replace some or all of the meetings and reports with the daily stand-up. Anyone who is directly involved in or wants to know about the day-to-day operation of the project should attend the single daily stand-up meeting.
But People not directly involved can disrupt the stand-up (See PIGS AND CHICKENS).  This suggests that another
forum would still be required for queries outside the scope of the stand-up.
Too many people in the meeting may cause disruption and/or cause people to be uncomfortable in sharing
information. For very large stand-up groups, it is even more important to followPIGS AND CHICKENS and TAKE IT OFFLINE in order to ensure all contributers can provide their input in a timely fashion. Not all forms of reporting will be, nor should be, covered by the stand-up format.  For example, overall project progress would be better communicated with a “big visible chart”[Jeffries, 2004] such as burndown, burn-up, cumulative flow diagram, etc. As a side-effect, some otherwise participants of the stand-up may be receiving sufficient information from the chart that they don't need to attend the stand-up regularly.
PIGS AND CHICKENS
A chicken and a pig are together when the chicken says, "Let's start a restaurant!".
The pig thinks it over and says, "What would we call this restaurant?".The chicken says, "Ham n' Eggs!"  The pig says, "No thanks, I'd be committed, but you'd only be involved!".
[Schwaber and Beedle, 2001]

[Beedle et al., 2000] Beedle, M. et al., “SCRUM: An Extension Pattern Language for Hyperproductive Software Development”


[LaPlante, 2003] Laplante, Phillip A., “Stand and Deliver: Why I Hate Stand-up Meetings”,ACM Queue, 1, 7 (October 2003)